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1 Local feminisms in context: new forms of
mobilisation: 1978–93
The experiences of the Palestinian national
movement in the Occupied Palestinian Territories
after the war of 1967 showed the importance of
public efforts to organise the masses. Mass
organisations were associated with different Palestine
Liberation Organisation (PLO) factions; each sought
to strengthen its following. While it may be argued
that a single organisation would have sufficed, these
divisions had the advantage of increasing the numbers
of people recruited, by appealing to the partisans of
all the political groups. It was also much harder to
destroy these new organisations which had a more
diffuse regionalised structure than the monolithic
organisations of the past.
For these reasons, and against the background of
intense national resistance in 1976, International
Women’s Day, 8 March 1978, was especially
important. Some activist women held a meeting
which resulted in the creation of the lajnet al-‘amal
al-nissaei (Women’s Work Committee). It was largely
made up of that generation of women who worked
in political organisations, especially in the left-wing
parties Democratic Front for the Liberation of
Palestine (DFLP), Popular Front for the Liberation of
Palestine (PFLP), the Communist Party, and Fateh,
and some independent women. These women tried
ceaselessly to join the structure of the General Union
of Palestinian Women (GUPW) headed at that time
by the national veteran Samiha Khalil, who denied
them access, fearing their ‘militant’ background
might threaten the powerful charitable
organisation’s façade of Family Rehabilitation Society
(in’ash al-usra). 
The Women’s Work Committee included women
who had emerged from the various voluntary work
camps that had proliferated after the 1976 municipal
elections, and who had Marxist–feminist orientations
towards political work. In time, a partisan power
struggle emerged within its ranks producing a
succession of women’s grassroots organisations (Jad
1990: 131).
The permanent splintering of the women’s
movement does not reflect differences in the
agenda and goals of the different groups. Rather, the
common goal of involving the greatest possible
number of women in the national movement
demanded flexibility. This, (contrary to the
membership conditions of the charitable
organisations) enabled women from different social
classes to participate; thus, the women’s movement
was not restricted to middle-class women as in the
past (Taraki 1989: 62). The first goal of all these
organisations was the nationalist struggle. However,
‘emancipating Palestinian women’ was an item on
the agenda of all the organisations, specifically the
left-oriented ones. The visible power of women in
the streets was opening a wider space for their
activism. All projects undertaken by the women’s
committees provided a permanent pool of recruits,
whether in the villages, refugee camps or cities. The
process in itself helped many women cadres to
develop an understanding of the needs and demands
of women with whom they worked. While the
number of organised women was limited, they
nonetheless represented a hegemonic bloc, which
challenged the discourse of the more conservative
societies or groups. 
At that time, women in these committees believed
strongly that the rising generation of Palestinian
leaders could not ignore the role of Palestinian
women in the resistance; women were going to be
liberated through a change in the laws and a long-
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term process of social change. This promise is still
unfulfilled and the hope remains that the leadership
of an independent Palestinian state will bring this to
fruitition.
2 The Palestinian women’s movements and the
first intifada
From the start of the first intifada in December 1987,
women of all ages and social classes, in particular
women from poor neighbourhoods and refugee
camps, were an integral part of all dominant forms
of resistance. Women’s actions were sometimes
violent, and they were often involved in serious
confrontations with the Israeli army (Jad 1990: 133).
Most importantly, the women’s role was crucial in
sustaining the intifada through the intensive internal
networks between the Unified National Leadership
of the Uprising (UNLU) and the masses. Networking
was built on traditional home visits by women,
providing support for prisoners, their families,
martyrs’ families and all other sectors or individuals
affected by Israeli oppression during the intifada.
Women in the Occupied Territories, like female
activists in the PLO in Lebanon, were empowered by
their important roles in the intifada, and began to
contest their own party positions. With the massive
scale of imprisonment of most of the underground
male leadership, women activists replaced them
(Jad 1990).
The massive success of the UNLU in organising and
mobilising hundreds of thousands of people into
peaceful and popular resistance was confronted by a
brutal Israeli policy of suppression involving mass
arrests, killings, home demolitions, school and
university closures, curfews and road closures. The
intifada also witnessed the emergence of the
Islamists as a political movement that strongly
contested the space so far controlled by the secular
nationalist forces. The first intifada was accompanied
by economic deterioration and a spread of poverty.
This led to contradictory gender effects: an
expansion of venues for women in the political
public sphere; and at the same time of venues for
more sexual control. The Israeli authorities frequently
used social conservatism, especially with regard to
female sexuality, to control the Palestinian
population: firstly, girls and women detained and
accused of nationalist activities were sexually
assaulted or threatened with such violence, especially
during interrogations; secondly, Israeli interrogators
frequently threatened sexual violence against
daughters, sisters, or wives as a method of extracting
information or ‘confessions’ from male detainees (Al-
Haq 1990: 208, 511–12 cited in Hasso 1997: 175). 
This policy, accompanied by school closures, poverty
and restrictions of movement led to many girls
dropping out of school and marrying at an early age.
It also led to the enforcement of the dress code
(veiling) advocated by the Islamists and seen by many
young activists as an act of national solidarity on the
part of women (Hammami 1991). The intifada ended
with the signing of the Oslo Agreement in 1993. In
the new phase that followed, Palestinians moved,
for the first time in their history, from people to
citizens governed by a Palestinian authority. 
3 The conundrums of post-Oslo Palestine: from
militants to citizens without citizenship
This section concerns the gendered Palestinian
nationalism and the gendering of Palestinian
citizenship in the aftermath of the creation of the
Palestinian Authority (PA) as a quasi-state. I consider
the importance of the state in the discussion of
women’s position and citizenship in the Arab world
in general, and in the Palestinian case in particular,
since states, as national movements, construct and
reconstruct gender and citizenship (Kandiyoti 1991;
Rai and Lievesley 1996; Molyneux 2001). 
The formation of the new PA includes the
reconstruction of the Palestinian ‘imagined’
community (Anderson 1983) within which approaches
to gender policies have been reformulated to suit a
new era. However, women are not passive subjects of
the PA. Therefore, I will also examine the impact of
women’s activism on PA policies and how it expands
the boundaries of their rights as equal citizens. 
I will demonstrate that women’s activism is not a
movement representing all women’s interests, but
rather a site of conflicting interests, power relations,
and variable positionings. I will argue that the
Palestinian women’s movement, in the process of
claiming citizenship rights and empowered by a
universal discourse on women’s rights, assumed the
‘normality’ of the newly established PA and that a
period of political stability would lead to a fulfilment
of their national, political and social rights. However,
the feminist use of the concept of citizenship itself is
in question under conditions of prolonged
Occupation. Citizenship requires a well-defined and
established state, which is not the case in Palestine.
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Most debates on citizenship refer to Thomas H.
Marshall who defined citizenship as ‘full membership
in the community’, encompassing civil, political, and
social rights and responsibilities (Marshall 1950;
Marshall and Bottomore 1992: 7; Keane 1988).
Feminists have extensively criticised Marshall’s
definition of citizenship in its assumption that
community is a gender-neutral arena, while ignoring
gender and/or cultural hierarchies and divisions along
race, class and ethnic lines. Moreover, the criteria for
citizenship remain implicitly based upon a male
subject. In addition, civil rights are limited, according
to his definition, to those able to assert their rights
through the legal process with financial backup
(Pateman 1988; Phillips 1991, 1993, 2002; Yuval-Davis
1991, 1993, 1997; Lister 1997; Voet 1998). Feminists
see citizenship as an important notion according to
which the relationship between the individual and
the state is defined. As such, women’s citizenship
should be considered not only in contrast to men’s,
but also in relation to women’s affiliation to
dominant or subordinate groups, their ethnicity,
origin and urban or rural residence (Yuval-Davis 1997).
In the Middle East, the emergence of the notion of
citizenship was related to the quest for equality for
women in the public sphere, and the attempt to
theorise women’s status in relation to both the state
and community (Joseph 1986: 3–8, 2000; Joseph and
Slymovics 2001; Molyneux 1985; Kandiyoti 1991, 2001).
This in turn was associated with a theorisation of
democracy and a heated debate over the relationship
between the state and civil society (Bishara 1996;
Norton 1993, 1995). The debate was widened to take
in Middle East states and societies which, in some
quarters, revived ‘an ahistorical notion of Middle
Eastern exceptionalism’ (Sadowski 1993; Zubaida
1988, 1995, 2000). These neo-Orientalists cast the
Middle East as blighted by a failure to modernise due
to its essentialised nature (Pipes 1983: 187–8 in
Sadowski 1993: 18; Bill and Springborg 1990; Lewis
1964, 1988; Kedourie 1992; Crone 1980).
Feminist evaluations of citizenship in the Middle East
suggest the question of women’s rights exposes
severe ‘fault lines in modern concepts of citizenship’
(Kandiyoti 2000: xv). The feminist critique focuses on
the continuing role of kin-based, communal entities
and their incorporation into different systems of
governance, either as recognised parts of the
political system, or as the source of various forms of
nepotism and clientelism (Kandiyoti 2000: xv). Some
feminists have argued that citizenship concepts do
not apply and call for a more culture-specific
approach (Joseph 1994, 2000; Al-Torki 2000;
Charrad 2000). Al-Torki, for example, has argued for
working through kinship and communal structures
that may act to empower and disempower women
simultaneously. Others have argued in favour of
citizenship concepts and call for the expansion of
women’s rights as individuals, and ‘condemn the
stranglehold that communal and religious forces
exercise over them’ (Kandiyoti 2000: xv; Hatem
2000; Hale 2000; Jad et al. 2000; Amawi 2000). 
These arguments assume that the state exists as a
sovereign entity within a well-defined territory,
which is not the case in Palestine. While citizenship
concepts may be applicable to states with recognised
sovereignty, women’s strategies to expand their
citizenship rights must be viewed in the light of the
general social, economic and political structures
affecting these rights. The call for rights in a situation
where the state does not exist in legal or political
terms might lead women to limit themselves to a
narrowly defined notion of liberal rights, while their
states and societies are falling apart. This might lead
to a greater marginalisation of women’s rights and
demands. 
In the Palestinian case, in the post-Oslo era, many
Palestinian women’s non-governmental organisations
(NGOs) shifted their attention and energy from
claiming their national rights through active and
popular resistance to the Israeli Occupation into a
focus on what was called the gender agenda. The
latter narrowly focused on claiming rights for women
from the Palestinian Authority (PA, not a state yet)
while the PA itself could not guarantee the physical
protection of those who would be its citizens. The
drastic shift contributed to some extent to the
demobilisation of what used to be a strong and
successful women’s movement. 
The modernising projects of post-colonial states in
the Arab world were gendered: policies to increase
women’s employment and education; control of
women’s fertility, and the provision of social services
were central to modernisation and led to changes in
gender relations. However, women’s introduction
into the labour market did not produce a substantive
change in the sexual division of labour. Women were
perceived by these national elites both as modern
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citizens and bearers of cultural authenticity (Anthias
and Yuval-Davis 1989). This contradiction was figured
in most of their national constitutions in which
women were defined as equal citizens but with
fewer rights than men because the realm of the
family remained governed by shari’a, which primarily
defines women as dependants. This dependent image
is not related to the shari’a interpretation alone but to
many cultural, social, economic and political factors
which are not conducive to the prioritisation of equal
gender relations (Welchman 1999). 
Women’s rights and shari’a law became part of a
dominant debate on the Middle East, including
Palestine, with the change of US policy in the region
after the terrorist attack on 11 September 2001. 
With the USA’s assumption of the mantle of the
sole superpower, and its invasion of Iraq in March
2003, the inability of the Arab despotic states to
change became a theme in US foreign policy. Their
recalcitrance ‘necessitates’ external intervention to
bring about desired change and democracy. The US-
led intervention, which dismantled one of the most
important post-colonial Arab states, not only
jeopardised the notion of citizenship but also the
notion of sovereignty on which it depends.
While most post-colonial Arab states are faced with
different economic, political and social crises, the
nascent PA confronts more immediately threatening
circumstances. The first concerns the practical
limitations of local resources which restrict the PA’s
capacity to deliver or to act for social transformation.
Most of these resources are hostage to Israeli control
and punitive actions (Khan and Hilal 2004). The second
concerns the very existence of the PA, with the
ongoing systematic destruction of its infrastructure
and most of its development projects. The third
concerns the existing political opposition, which is
empowered by the ongoing confrontation and the
lack of a peace agreement. The fourth concerns the
nature of the PA policies themselves and their impact
on the content of women’s citizenship. 
The unfolding events occurring in the Palestinian
territories and society since the signing of the Oslo
Agreement renders it difficult to reach anything but
provisional judgments on the ongoing crisis. In this
context, writing about the Oslo Agreement, the
particular event which set the context for women’s
rights claims, is a somewhat frustrating exercise.
However, it is useful to pause and consider what the
Oslo Agreement set in motion and how women’s
claims relate to the national situation.
The Palestinian quasi-state cannot define its
community or its rights, nor can it delineate or control
its borders in these terms. Thus, the quasi-state could
not determine who is a Palestinian and who is not
under the Oslo Agreements (1993–5).
As far as citizenship is concerned, no Palestinian may
hold a passport without Israeli approval. Palestinian
refugees in the diaspora cannot visit or return to their
homeland and they remain stateless. Palestinians
resident in Gaza and the West Bank may not visit
each other without a permit issued by Israeli security.
If both have permits to visit each other, they cannot
reach their fellow ‘citizens’ in Arab Jerusalem,
considered after its ‘unification’ in 1967 as the eternal
capital of the state of Israel with its Palestinian
residents given a special, revocable status. Other
aspects of the Israeli Occupation policies continued to
be manifested under Palestinian rule: expansion of
Israeli settlements, land confiscation, demolition of
houses, restriction of movement, control of economic
resources, harassments and arrests.
Meanwhile, the PA cannot protect its ‘citizens,’
although it was assigned the mission of guarding
Israeli security, which in practice meant preventing
any act of resistance to the ongoing Occupation. The
Oslo Agreement also led to the stratification of the
Palestinian citizenry. A VIP-A citizen status was given
to selected PA personnel to facilitate their
movements between different areas under the PA’s
control. A small stratum of high-ranking personnel,
mostly males, were granted this privilege (Roy 1998:
19–25). The impact of these conditions and sanctions
has left deep scars on the Palestinian community at
large and on gender relations in particular. The
interim period of five years, as defined in the Oslo
Agreement, expired in May 1999. With the outbreak
of the al-Aqsa intifada in September 2000, all these
‘privileges’ were withdrawn and the PA was depicted
as a terrorist group with a terrorist President (the
‘Israeli Osama Bin Laden’, no longer a partner for
peace according to Prime Minister Sharon). 
4 From home-grown feminism to universalism
The role played by Palestinian NGOs before the Oslo
Agreement differs significantly from their role in the
post-Oslo phase. Before the formation of the PA,
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Palestinian society was organised in and around
political parties and grassroots mass organisations.
NGOs linked to these parties under the umbrella of
the PLO encouraged and financially supported the
parties and their satellite organisations. While the
PLO and its political parties were banned by Israel,
their satellite organisations were to some extent
allowed to work since they were seen as service
provision organisations. Between the end of the
1987 intifada and the Oslo Agreement, the NGO
sector was used as the main channel of foreign aid
which resulted in service delivery at the grassroots
level, including clinics, schools, kindergartens, and
income-generating projects. This resulted in these
NGO actors becoming important and acquiring even
more power than their parent parties. 
The role of NGOs in the West Bank and Gaza
shifted under the influence of the state-building
process initiated by the Madrid Conference in 1991. I
argue that the dual dynamics of state building and
‘NGOisation’ led to more fragmentation and
demobilisation of all social movements. The NGO
approach, of small projects of limited duration, did
not prove to be equipped to mobilise or to liaise
with other social movements and groups on issues
of national concern. The limited life cycle of ‘projects’
induced fragmentation, rather than bringing about
what Tarrow has called ‘sustainable networking’
(Tarrow 1994). 
NGOisation also has a cultural dimension, spreading
values that favour dependency, lack of self-reliance
and new modes of consumption. For example,
advertisements in Palestinian newspapers commonly
describe collective community actions, organised by
groups of youth, such as cleaning the streets,
planting trees, painting the walls, etc. followed by a
little icon indicating the name of the donors who
funded ‘these projects’. Many of the NGO activities
are held in fancy hotels, serving fancy food,
distributing glossy material, hiring ‘presentable’ youth
to help organise the event or the activity. This has led
to the gradual disappearance of the ‘old’ image of
the casual activist with the peasant accent and look. 
Thus NGOisation as a process also introduces
changes in the composition of the women’s
movement (Goetz 1997) which results, I argue, in a
shift in power relations. My study shows a shift from
‘power to’ women in the grassroots to ‘power over’
them (Agarwal 1994) by the new elite.
In what follows I deal with a widely used approach
by many NGOs in the Palestinian context in which
the feminist slogan ‘the private is the public’ was
applied to ‘engender’ the national agenda.
How can women’s feminist organisations promote
women’s rights within Palestinian society while the
rights of the whole society are being systematically
violated? How can they justify work for feminist
social change in circumstances where people still
need to secure their basic needs? Some feminist
NGOs address these questions in two ways. Firstly,
they ensure their work is decentralised, practical and
relevant to the daily lives of women and men under
the Occupation through the establishment of local
committees on women’s rights and training some
cadres on women’s rights. Secondly, through the
media and educational programmes, they try to
promote a new understanding of ‘patriotic acts’ as
including the activities women perform in private as
well as public, such as caring for their families,
lobbying for women’s rights and fighting violence
against women. Women’s private and public
activities represent important acts of resistance to an
Occupation that undermines the social infrastructure
of Palestinian society (IDS Bridge 2003).
In this statement, the national arena seems to be
reconfigured in terms of bringing what women do in
private to the public, through the medium of
publications, and giving ‘new meanings’ to what is
‘patriotic’ through training, workshops and advocacy
of universal women’s rights. The new meanings are
expressed through presenting the resistance to
domestic violence and lobbying for women’s rights
as a ‘patriotic act’. This raises many questions about
how the connection is made between discourse,
participants and organisations (Tarrow 1994),
between the private and the public (Pateman 1988;
Eisenstein 1989; Phillips 1993), between how
different women’s interests are perceived by
themselves (Molyneux 2001), and by ‘the outsiders –
animateurs’ (Friedman 1992: 144). The answers might
also reflect the lack of consideration given to the
role of collective overt actions in articulating and
constituting a women’s gender agenda. 
Discourses are not innocent, but can become very
powerful. The more dominant a discourse, the more
it operates as a set of rules about what can and
cannot be said and done. When a discourse becomes
powerful, we have to ask how it affects NGO
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practice in its interplay with alternative and everyday
discourse (Hilhorst 2003: 11). Thus, new discourse is
not about the use of new jargon or new
vocabularies, it is rather about building social power
and building a social movement. 
The content of democratisation is not separated
from the form of organisation nor from how
participants put forward their interests and ideas in
order to find the best way to politicise them. This
might contradict claims that NGOs are the engines
for democratisation. Palestinian NGO structures are
more exclusive than inclusive. Furthermore, rather
than functioning as a mobilising structure, NGOs
proved to be agents of fragmentation which were
used as a power base for a newly formed elite to
promote their own position in the leadership of the
women’s movement and other social movements.
The process of consultation and networking which
was meant to achieve a broad representation of
women’s interests ended up representing only the
views of the NGOs themselves.
We may note similar outcomes in the literature
where the participation of local communities is seen
as detrimental to guaranteeing a ‘real’ expression of
their needs and interests. Farrington et al. (1993),
warn that many development agencies (whether
governmental or non-governmental) seek
‘participation’ simply in order to get local agreement
to a predetermined agenda. 
The study of some active feminist NGOs in the
Palestinian context revealed that ‘real’ participation
was considered, by some, as a hindrance and it was
not seen as enriching the agenda under discussion.
Although many feminist NGOs had set up a series of
workshops as a consultative mechanism at the end of
which it was apparent that there was a divergence of
views, the feminist NGOs nonetheless tried to
preserve their visions and ignored the feedback. The
time, effort and resources invested in the different
workshops and mechanisms used to enhance the
‘participation’ of women did not inform or redirect
the predetermined universal agenda: that total
equality in reforming law should be the guiding
principle used to represent all women’s interests. 
The approach adopted by many women’s NGOs,
based on individual and universal women’s rights,
worked on the assumption that social power rests
with the state, in the form of the PA, and not in
other social and political groups opposing and
competing with it (i.e. the Islamists). This approach,
based on international conventions, ignored to a
great extent home-grown, locally developed
feminisms and the historical realities of different
layers of colonialism and Occupation and the roles
imposed upon, or accepted by, women (Nesiah
1996: 1). 
An NGO, targeting the state to secure women’s
rights, might not provide a sufficiently robust power
base to support claims for all Palestinian women’s
rights. I argue that this approach provided important
grounds for the Islamists, as a powerful social and
political movement, to discredit and de-legitimise
these claims as not representative of the ‘true’
interests of women and to cast aspersions on
feminists as lacking authenticity.
As I argued above, discourse is not mere words but
rather ‘collective action frames for social movements
and its power structure’ (Snow and Benford 1988:
198; Tarrow 1994: 122). The ‘new’ discourse based on
liberal individual rights, used by the new NGO elite,
might be interpreted to discredit old forms of
organisation and as a means of co-opting popular
organisations. The NGO discourse was used to forge
a space in the public arena at the expense of old
mass-based organisations. It recast the ‘old’ basis for
legitimacy founded on resisting the Occupation and
sacrificing for the nation as a basis for women’s
subordination and isolation. This old basis for
legitimacy portrayed women as ‘givers’ to their
communities and caring for their people. Women
were valued for this role which opened for them
new spaces in the public and private spheres. Moving
to a strict ‘gender agenda’ based on universal rights,
led to the portrayal of feminists (mainly by their
Islamist opponents) as ‘takers’ of individual rights at
the expense of the ‘collective’ plight of their nation. 
5 Conclusion 
I argued in this article that, in a context of
unachieved national independence, separating
women’s rights from collective national rights risks
leading to the marginalisation of women as a social
group and subsequently to fragmentation.
The point here is to question if the purportedly
‘counter-hegemonic’ discourse of universal rights is
deployed to increase or decrease women’s social
activism and their political power. I believe any
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counter-hegemonic discourse must take into account
the ‘totality of the historical situation, which includes
both the structural and superstructural element’
(Bobbio 1987: 89) whether this is the continuation of
the Occupation, an impotent authority, weakened
political parties, weakened women’s organisations or
the growing power of Islamic movements. I do not
believe that NGO activism begins to do this.
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